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Liuzzi: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego

COMMENT

METROMEDIA, INC. V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO
LAw-Billboards carrying commercial messages
can be regulated based on governmental interests in traffic safety
and aesthetics; when regulating noncommercial billboards a city
cannot distinguish between the content of the messages. 453 U.S.
490 (1981).
CONSTITUTIONAL

INTRODUCTION

Although billboards have become a fixture of modern day life,
they are not always openly accepted by the communities in which
they exist. Since the beginning of the century,1 they have been regulated under the scope of the police power.2 Attempts to extend first
amendment protection s to'billboards as a medium of communication
were rejected 4 until 1976, when the Supreme Court, in Virginia
1. See, e.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909); City of
Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267
(1905); Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905); Horton v. Old Colony Bill
Posting Co., 36 R.I. 507, 90 A. 822 (1914).
2. Under the police power, state and local governments can enact restrictions to protect
the public safety, health, morals or general welfare. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526
(1917). For a discussion of billboards and the police power, see Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and the Realities of Billboard Control, 9 ECoLOGY L. Q. 295, 300 (1981); Note, The Effect of First Amendment Protectionof
Commercial Speech on Municipal Sign Ordinances, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 941, 943-47
(1978); Note, The Media Win the Billboard Battle, but Metro Wins the War: Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 493, 502-06 (1981).
3. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
4. Prior to the recognition that commercial speech is entitled to first amendment protection, all the cases in which the courts examined billboard regulations in light of the first
amendment held that regulation of commercial speech did not infringe on free speech. See,
e.g., Howard v. State Dep't of Highways of Colo., 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973); United
Advertising Corp. v. Bourough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Markham Advertising Co. v.
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Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Citizens Council,5 held

commercial speech to be protected by the first amendment. For the
first time, courts were forced to closely examine the type of speech
regulated by billboard ordinances. Some courts vehemently struck
down billboard regulations because of their infringement of noncommercial speech.' Others upheld widespread billboard prohibitions 7 or
commercial speech regulations of outdoor advertising.' One court
went so far as to approve a regulation of noncommercial billboards
State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
5. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Board, the Court held a statute which prohibited
commercial advertisement of prescription drug prices to be unconstitutional. Id. at 770. The
groundwork for this decision was laid the year before in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), when the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting any advertisement, encouragement or
procurement of an abortion. The Court stated that speech is not stripped of first amendment
protection merely because it appears in the form of a paid commercial advertisement. Id. at
818.
These decisions overturned the long standing precedent that commercial speech was not
entitled to first amendment protection. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
6. See, e.g., John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 369 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1980), affd, 453
U.S. 916 (1981) (invalidating a state-wide ban of billboards due to its infringement on noncommercial speech); State v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922
(1981) (construing a state-wide prohibition of billboards upon rural roads of state as not covering noncommercial speech to avoid constitutional problems). Regulations directed only at noncommercial speech have also been found to be unconstitutional. Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540
F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977) (invalidating an ordinance that
prohibited campaign signs); Aiona v. Pai, 516 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1975) (invalidating an ordinance that regulated campaign signs).
7. See, e.g., John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978) (upholding statewide ban of outdoor advertising as valid regulation of time, place or manner),
rev'd, John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), affd, 453 U.S. 916
(1981); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.3d 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 610 P.2d
407 (1980) (upholding city-wide ban of billboards, although it was perceived by the majority
to only regulate commercial speech), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (reversing ban as an infringement on noncommercial speech); Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md.
660, 370 A.2d 1127 (Ct. App. 1977) (upholding ban of all off-premise outdoor advertising in
urban renewal area); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206,
339 N.E.2d 709 (1975) (upholding total ban of outdoor advertising throughout city); Suffolk
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1977)
(upholding town-wide ban of off-premise billboards which the dissent points out is directed at
all speech and not just commercial speech), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Sign Supplies of Texas, Inc. v. McConn, 517 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(upholding regulation of size, height, location and construction of signs within city); Stuckey's
Stores, Inc. v. O'Cheskey, 93 N.M. 312, 600 P.2d 258 (1979) (upholding regulation of commercial billboards on interstate highways); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741
(N.D. 1978) (upholding regulation of commercial billboards on interstate highways as reasonable time, place or manner regulation), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); Lubbock
Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (upholding city regulation of the location, proximity, size, separation and height of off-premise billboards), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d
905, 602 P.2d 1177 (1979).
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that left some commercial billboards unregulated.,
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,10 the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the first amendment protection afforded billboards, but accomplished only a further muddying of the waters."1
The Court considered the constitutionality of a San Diego ordinance
designed to eliminate alleged traffic hazards and to improve the
city's appearance. The suit was initiated by several outdoor advertising companies that owned signs in San Diego 12 to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance that prohibited almost all outdoor advertising
in the city.' 3 The Court mustered a majority to invalidate the ordi9. State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921
(1979) (statute prohibited all signs visible from interstate, primary or scenic highway systems
with exceptions for some commercial speech signs).
10. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
11. Early Supreme Court decisions upheld city ordinances that regulated billboards as a
reasonable exercise of the police power. See St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). In
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932), the Court upheld a state statute which forbade
the advertising of cigarettes and other tobacco products on billboards, streetcar signs and placards. None of these Supreme Court decisions adjudicated the billboard regulation as a first
amendment violation.
Since then, the Court has not substantively reviewed any billboard regulation. It summarily affirmed three billboard decisions in Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Newman
Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); and Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439
U.S. 808 (1978). The court cited a state billboard decision with approval in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 68, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976) (citing Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appealdismissed, 393 U.S. 316
(1969)), and discussed billboards in a decision concerning a public transit advertising regulation, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 302 (1974). Most recently, in Linmark
Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court expressly refrained
from deciding "whether a ban on signs or a limitation on the number of signs could survive
constitutional scrutiny if it were unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. at 94 n.7
(citations omitted).
12. On cross motions for summary judgment, the California Superior Court held the
ordinance unconstitutional as an unreasonable exercise of the police power and a violation of
first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 67
Cal. App. 3d 84, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, (Ct. App. 1977). After the superior court issued an
injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance, the city appealed. The court of appeals
affirmed on the ground that the ordinance constituted an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise
of the police power, but did not address the first amendment issue. Id. Upon appeal to the
California Supreme Court, the decision was reversed. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
23 Cal. 3d 762, 154 Cal. Rptr. 212, 592 P.2d 728 (1979), modified, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510, 610 P.2d 407 (1980). The California Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a
reasonable exercise of the police power and a valid time, place or manner regulation.
13. The ordinance excluded from its coverage on-premise signs and twelve other categories of signs: Signs in discharge of a governmental function; bench signs at public bus stops;
signs manufactured, transported or stored in the city, if not used for advertising purposes;
commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols; signs enclosed in a shopping mall; "for
sale" or "for rent" signs; signs depicting time, temperature, or news; signs on public transpor-
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nance, but as Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent, "the Court's
treatment of the subject [is] . . . a virtual Tower of Babel, from
which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn. 114 The sharp di-

vision among the Justices is evidenced in the five separate opinions
written, 15 which demonstrate that the issues are far from resolved
and portend a disturbing erosion in the fundamental right to free
speech.
A plurality of four Justices concluded that although the ordinance was a valid regulation of commercial speech, it unconstitutionally infringed upon noncommercial speech. 6 Justice White, writing
for the plurality, deferred to the legislative judgment rather than analyze the commercial speech infringement before the Court. The resulting low standard of scrutiny jeopardizes the protection afforded
to commercial speech. In evaluating the constitutionality of the ordinance's regulation of noncommercial speech, the plurality compared
the regulation of commercial speech with that of noncommercial
speech,17 injecting a new, and perhaps unnecessary, form of balancing into the plethora of first amendment standards.
The other five Justices envisioned the San Diego ordinance as
requiring a different type of analysis than the commercial/noncommercial speech dichotomy. Justices Brennan and Blackmun, in a
concurrence,18 and Justice Stevens, in a dissent,19 asserted that the
case presented the issue of a total ban of billboards, yet their different approaches to evaluate the ordinance led to contrary results. In
short, Justices Brennan and Blackmun performed a more stringent
analysis, while Justice Stevens employed what amounted to a time,
place or manner analysis.
The Chief Justice's dissenting opinion2" attempted an eclectic
tation or commercial vehicles; temporary off-premises subdivision directional signs; and temporary political campaign signs. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 101.0700 B., F. (1972).
14. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
15. 453 U.S. at 493 (White, J.joined by Stewart, Marshall & Powell JJ.);
id. at 521
(Brennan, J.,
concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.); id. at 540 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part);
Id. at 555 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
16. 453 U.S. at 493 (White, J.,
joined by Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ.). The plurality essentially followed the analysis of the first circuit in John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell,
639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), affd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981). A Maine state-wide statute had
banned billboards except for on-site advertising and several noncommercial exemptions. The
Donnelly court held the statute to be a valid time, place or manner regulation of commercial
speech, but unconstitutional with respect to its infringement on noncommercial speech.
17. 453 U.S. at 513.
18. Id. at 522 (Brennan, J.,
concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.).
19. Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
20. Id. at 555 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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approach to the problem, but, as was true with Justice Stevens, performed no more than a time, place or manner analysis. Justice
Rehnquist added his views that the exceptions to the ordinance did
not render it unconstitutional and that the government interest in
aesthetics was sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards. 2'
Rehnquist refrained, however, from proposing yet another method of
analyzing the San Diego ordinance.
In the past, a total ban of a medium of communication has not
received widespread attention from the Court. 22 Justices Brennan
and Stevens and Chief Justice Burger proposed standards in Metromedia that have ramifications for the future of billboards and,
more significantly, for the whole range of media protected by the
first amendment. On the whole, the Justices were satisfied with a
middle level of scrutiny, which could allow a total ban of a communication medium or seriously impair its use. These standards of review, however, are clearly insufficient in light of the first amendment
interests at issue.
Part I of this article critically examines the plurality opinion
and its bifurcated approach. Part II then evaluates the remaining
Justices' opinions, their respective standards, and the proposition of a
total ban. Finally, part III proposes a more stringent standard for a
total ban of billboards.
I.

THE PLURALITY OPINION

Commercial Speech
In evaluating the constitutionality of the commercial speech aspects of the ordinance, the plurality"3 applied the four part test developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,2 4 which states: (1) The first amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech
is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental
interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no farther than necessary to accomplish the given objective.25 The plurality
systematically analyzed the San Diego ordinance under each step of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 569-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
453 U.S. at 507.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 563-64.
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this standard.
To satisfy the first criteria, the plurality asserted that the activity being regulated was lawful and not misleading,2 6 and proceeded
to consider whether there existed a substantial governmental interest
to justify the regulation. The plurality declared that substantial governmental interests existed in traffic safety and aesthetics. 27 Although previous Supreme Court cases were relied on as authority for
the proposition, 28 none had made the determination in a first amendment context. The applicability of those decisions to the present case
is questionable because the level of scrutiny employed was much
lower than that required in a first amendment analysis. 29 While traffic safety and aesthetics have been recognized as legitimate governmental concerns under the police power (where only the reasonableness of the regulation must be proved)30 none of these cases held that
traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental interests.
In Metromedia, the plurality failed to demonstrate how those governmental interests outweigh first amendment rights.31
26. 453 U.S. at 507.
27. Id. at 507-08. For a discussion of the effects of billboards on aesthetics and traffic
safety, see Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 301-15; Lucking, The Regulation of OutdoorAdvertising: Past, Present and Future, 6 ENVTL. Ann. 179 (1977); Williams, Subjectivity, Expression,
and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1 (197v).
28. 453 U.S. at 508. The Court cited Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (declaration of Grand Central Terminal as landmark held to be
reasonable police power and not a taking of property without just compensation in violation of
fifth amendment); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (ordinance restricting
land use to one-family dwelling rationally related to legitimate government objective and not a
deprivation of fundamental rights); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding power
of eminent domain for community redevelopment); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding statute prohibiting operation of vehicles with advertising from city
streets, except for those advertising vehicle owners' products, because class of signs rationally
related to city's interest in traffic safety).
29. The standard of review employed in those cases was the Court's most deferential
"rational relation" scrutiny used in due process analysis but is not applicable in first amendment analysis. One commentator observed:
On several occasions, but always in a commercial context, the Court has held
that absolute, or at least highly restrictive, prohibitions on the use of billboards and
advertising vehicles do not constitute a deprivation of property in violation of the
Due Process Clause. None of those decisions addressed the First Amendment issue,
however, and they are therefore inapposite to the question under consideration.
Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 233, 257 n.100.
30. See 453 U.S. at 528 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring); infra note 44.
31. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 893-94, 164 Cal. Rptr.
510, 537, 610 P.2d 407, 434 (1980) (Clark, J., dissenting), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), where
precisely this objection was advanced by Justice Clark concerning the majority opinion of the
California Supreme Court, which upheld the ban of billboards by summarily classifying the
governmental interest in traffic safety and aesthetics as substantial without weighing them
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There are important commercial speech interests at issue that
were not discussed by the plurality. Commercial speech has been
recognized by the Court as deserving first amendment protection because of consumer and societal interests in the free flow of information.32 The underlying rationale was that the need for information to
enable commercial decisionmaking may be as crucial to society as
the exchange of political ideas. 3 Billboards are perhaps best known
for their role in the dissemination of commercial information and are
indispensible for effectively reaching travelers in a manner which
could not be duplicated by other media.3 4 Even though the Court in
Metromedia believed that the governmental interest outweighed the
first amendment interests, it deserved more than a summary
determination.
Furthermore, any claim that substantial government interests
existed in traffic safety and aesthetics is undermined by the exceptions35 to the ordinance.36 Most notably, the exception permitting onagainst first amendment interests.
32. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976).
33. The court in Virginia Board noted, when justifying the protection of commercial
speech, that:
- As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commerical information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate.
.. . [S]o long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable. . . . And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to
enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow
of information does not serve that goal.
Id. at 763, 765 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
The notion that there is a sound rationale for extending first amendment protection to
commercial speech is disputed. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
34. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 22-23 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1980)
(Pettine, J., concurring), arfd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981) (discussing the importance of billboards to
those displaying commercial messages because of their capacity for timely appeals to travelers
and their importance to the travelers themselves).
35. See supra note 13.
36. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d at 11 (governmental interest in
traffic safety for state-wide ban of billboards diminished in overall importance because excep-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 11:371

site37 signs would present the same traffic safety hazards and aesthetic problems as do off-site signs.3 8 Although the plurality stated
that "[t]he exceptions to the general prohibition are of great significance in addressing the strength of the city's interest in prohibiting
billboards," 3 9 the Justices assembled their own justifications for the
exceptions. They pointed out that the prohibition of off-site signs related to the city's objectives, even if the prohibition was underinclusive in that it permitted on-site advertising to exist.40 Moreover, the
plurality speculated that the differential treatment by the city was
based on a belief that off-site signs presented more of a problem than
on-site signs.4 1 However, there was no evidence submitted by the city
to support the plurality's speculations. As a final possibility, the plurality suggested that San Diego had simply decided that on-site signs
were more important than off-site signs.' 2 On each of these points,
the plurality fashioned arguments to justify the city's position rather
than putting the burden on the city to prove their case.
The crucial weakness of the plurality opinion lies in its deference to the legislative determinations that fostered the regulations.
The Justices declined to require substantive evidence from San Diego or to make an independent determination concerning the existence of a substantial governmental interest and the reasons for the
exceptions to the ordinance. This is true in other important areas of
the plurality's analysis as well. Even though the plurality mentioned
the California Supreme Court's statement in Metromedia, that there
was a "meager record" proving a direct connection between billboards and traffic safety,43 the plurality followed the California
court's lead to recognize the connection and stated that it "hesitate[d] to disagree with many reviewing courts that billboards are
tions to ordinance retained some dangerous signs).
37. On-premise or on-site signs are defined as "signs designating the name of the owner
or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or
signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon
which such signs are placed. . . ." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 493
n.1 (quoting SAN DIEGo, CAL-, MumciPA. CODE § 101.0700 (B) (1972)).
38. Off-premise or off-site signs are defined as a "sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on the premises," or a "sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manufactured on the premises." Id.
39. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 520.
40. Id. at 511.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 512.
43. Id. at 508 citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 858-59, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510, 515, 610 P.2d 407, 412 (1980).
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real and substantial hazards to traffic safety."'4" Regarding the asserted governmental interest in aesthetics, the plurality contended
that it was "not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very
nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived
an 'esthetic harm'. 45
As justification for these statements, the plurality quoted language from Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 41 which
called for reliance on local government's judgment regarding the legitimacy of municipal problems. While it may be proper to defer to
legislative judgments on questions of the police power as in Railway
Express, the same is not true when a court is confronted with a first
amendment challenge. 47 In fact, there is precedent that requires the
Court to make an independent inquiry and judgment:
In every case ...

where legislative abridgment of the rights is

asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance
of democratic institutions. And so . . . the delicate and difficult

task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. 48
44. 453 U.S. at 509. Both Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, id. at 528 n.7, and
Justice Clark, dissenting in the California Supreme Court decision, 26 Cal. 3d at 890-91, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 534-36, 610 P.2d at 431-32, criticized their respective courts for basing the
purported connection between traffic safety hazards and billboards on cases that predate recognition of commercial speech. In those cases, Justice Brennan noted that the courts utilized
minimal "rational relation" scrutiny which is insufficient to sustain the regulation in the face
of a first amendment challenge. 453 U.S. at 528 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. 453 U.S. at 510. This rationale would seem to jeopardize the first amendment protections extended to other aesthetically displeasing media such as sound trucks and leaflets.
46. Id. at 509 (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109
(1949)). Railway Express involved an ordinance that prohibited commercial advertising on
motor vehicles. Any possible violation of the first amendment was not considered by the Court
because the case predated recognition of constitutional protection of commercial speech.
47. Professor Thomas Emerson has severely criticized the Burger Court for displaying
"a preference for legislative judgment over first amendment values." Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAUF. L. Rav. 422, 442 (1980).
48. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (quoted in Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1981)). Ironically, the plurality in Metromedia quoted this
same language to criticize Chief Justice Burger for giving too much weight to legislative preference in his dissenting opinion. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 519-20. See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (stating it is a legislative and not a
judicial function to declare the reasons compelling legislative action because "[w]ere it otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative definition
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By their deference, the plurality undermined the protection afforded
commercial speech, granting it the lowest level of court scrutiny.
Yet, in other first amendment cases, the Court has not shirked its
obligation to closely scrutinize evidence presented or to note its complete absence.49 In Metromedia, the Court had a responsibility to be
especially scrupulous in its considerations of available evidence because of disparate lower court billboard regulation decisions. Those
decisions dispute the relation between traffic safety and billboards,50
the sufficiency of aesthetics to outweigh first amendment interests, 51
and the constitutionality of a distinction between on- and off-site
signs."2
and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power would be nullified");
John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980), affid, 453 U.S. 916 (1981)
("when First Amendment freedoms are on one side of the scale, the balance must be struck by
the courts, not by the legislators").
49. For example, in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), the Court
refused to accept the justifications asserted by the borough for totally banning live entertainment in that community. The borough asserted that the ban was part of a plan to develop a
commercial area to service only immediate needs. Justice White, writing the majority opinion,
noted that no evidence was introduced to support this plan. Id. at 72-73 (White, J., majority
opinion). The borough also contended that a community could selectively prohibit live entertainment to avoid problems such as parking, trash collection, and police protection. In response, Justice White stated that "[t]he Borough has presented no evidence, and it is not
immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that live entertainment poses problems of this
nature more significant than those associated with various permitted uses." Id. at 73.
50. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977); John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir.
1980), aSf'd 453 U.S. 916 (1981); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369
Mass. 206, 217, 339 N.E.2d 709, 716 (1975); State v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 342 (Okla. 1979),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). But see Veterans of Foreign Wars v. City of Steamboat
Springs, 195 Colo. 44, 51-52, 575 P.2d 835, 840 (1978); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268
N.W.2d 741, 761 (N.D. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); State v. Lotze, 92
Wash. 2d 52, 57, 60, 593 P.2d 811, 814, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Markham
Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 421-24, 439 P.2d 248, 262-63 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
51. See, e.g., Farrell v. Township of Teaneck, 126 N.J. Super. 460, 465, 315 A.2d 424,
426-27, (1974); State v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 342 (Okla. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922
(1981). But see John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 11-13 (Ist Cir. 1980), affid,
453 U.S. 916 (1981), John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (D. Me.
1978), rev'd on other grounds,John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980),
af'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass.
206, 218-28, 339 N.E.2d 709, 716-22 (1975).
52. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Des Plaines, 26 I1. App. 3d 942, 945-46, 326
N.E.2d 59, 62 (1975); But see Inhabitants of the Town of Boothbay v. National Advertising
Co., 347 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1975); John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272,
1278 (D. Me. 1978), rev'd, John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980),
afd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981); Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660,
669-70, 370 A.2d 1127, 1132-33 (1977); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 75859 (N.D. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979).
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If the plurality had not been so solicitous of legislative judgment, it might have reached a different conclusion regarding the
final step of the Central Hudson test-whether the San Diego ordinance was drawn narrowly enough to survive a first amendment
challenge. There should have been careful consideration of whether
the regulation was more inclusive or more burdensome than necessary to further a legitimate government purpose and whether the
least restrictive means available were used. 3 The plurality apparently assumed that San Diego's interest in regulating billboards was
the same throughout the city. It seems disingenuous to state that
billboards are a traffic hazard at every location in the city considering the variation of speed limits on any stretch of road.54 It has also
been disputed whether billboards are aesthetically inconsistent with
commercial and industrial areas.55 Assuming that the potential
hazards of billboards justify a governmental response of some kind,
the plurality should have explored the possibility that regulating the
number, location, size, appearance or lighting of billboards might
have accomplished the same result without so seriously infringing on
first amendment freedoms.
Noncommercial Speech
After the plurality decided that San Diego's regulation of commercial speech was constitutional, the Justices turned their attention
to its effect on noncommercial speech. The plurality first observed
that the ordinance permitted on-site signs with commercial messages
while not allowing on-site noncommercial signs to exist.58 The Justices viewed this limited exception as an improper ranking of commercial speech above the more cherished noncommercial speech.
Due to the inversion of first amendment values, the plurality concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
53. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. One court has vividly stated that
"public officials may not wield an axe when a scalpel is required." King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp.
653, 661 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
54. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1980), afl'd, 453
U.S. 916 (1981); Peltz v. City of S. Euclid, 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 133, 228 N.E.2d 320, 324

(1967); State v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 342 (Okla. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
55. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine,
J., concurring), ard,453 U.S. 916 (1981); E.B. Elliot Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1152 (5th Cir. 1970). But see John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor

Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 221-25, 339 N.E.2d 709, 716-20 (1975).
56.

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 513.

57. Id. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1980), affid,
453 U.S. 916 (1981); Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Town of Southington, 508 F.
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The assertion that noncommercial speech is entitled to greater
protection than commercial speech is beyond dispute.,, But to hold a
regulation of noncommercial speech invalid because it affords commercial speech less protection belies logic. The error of the plurality
rests on the assumption that the San Diego ordinance regulates commercial speech to the full extent permitted by the first amendment.
If this assumption were correct, a more restrictive regulation of noncommercial speech would be unconstitutional, since noncommercial
speech is subject to lesser regulation than commercial speech.
But what if the city's regulation of commercial speech did not
go to the constitutional limit and regulated commercial speech to
only a minor extent? In that case, a regulation of noncommercial
speech that was stricter than the commercial regulation might well
be constitutional so long as it did not exceed what would be the constitutional limit of the commercial speech regulation.
A more important consideration is that this type of comparison
between commercial speech and noncommercial speech to determine
the constitutionality of noncommercial speech, muddles the protection afforded noncommercial speech. It adds a new form of balancing to what some commentators believe is an already confusing array
of first amendment standards.59 Regulations of noncommercial
speech traditionally are evaluated in terms of whether the regulation
addresses the content or the subject matter of speech.60 For that reason, the second part of the plurality's .analysis holds more
Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1980); Van v. Travel Information Council, 52 Or. App. 399, 628 P.2d
1217, 1222 (1981).
58. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the Court stated:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
Id. at 456. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 578
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
The Court has sometimes had difficulty embodying this presumption in its decisions. In
Lehman v. Village of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a regulation that allowed the sale of space in municipal public transportation cars for
commercial advertising but prohibited the sale for political advertising. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, criticized the majority for reversing the traditional priorities of the first amendment. Id. at 314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 47, at 440-54; infra note 207.
60. See Infra note 63.
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significance.
As an alternative approach, the plurality examined the noncommercial signs that were permitted, such as temporary campaign signs
and religious symbols. 61 Strictly applying the precedent prohibiting
any discrimination based on the content of the message, the Justices
concluded that San Diego had attempted to distinguish between permissible and impermissible speech based on its subject matter, and
thus found the statute unconstitutional. 62 In other words, it held that
if some noncommercial messages are allowed, all must be permitted.
Attempts at regulating the content or the subject matter of
speech are ordinarily subject to strict scrutiny.63 Several cases, however, have held that a government regulation can discriminate
among speech-related activities if it is finely tailored to serve substantial state interests." To be complete in its analysis, it seems that
the plurality should have considered whether San Diego had a substantial government interest justifying its distinction among noncommercial signs. Some of the limited exceptions allowing signs, such as
that for directional signs, might be justified by public necessity. The
exception for political campaign signs could not, however, be sustained on that assumption. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens suggested that this exception was justified based on a governmental interest in the dissemination of information of special
public concern. 3 This rationale, however, would grant government
the ability to select the messages for signs, and consequently for pub61. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 514.
62. Id. at 514-15.
63.

See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (prohibi-

tion of inserts in monthly billing envelopes dealing with controversial issues of public policy
held unconstitutional); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating statute that prohib-

ited picketing of residences unless it was peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved
in a labor dispute); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1978) (holding ordinance unconstitutional that prohibited picketing at school except for peaceful picketing related to a labor dispute). For a discussion of the content standards in first amendment analysis see Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 Gso. L. J. 727 (1980);
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81 (1978); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. Cmi. L. REv. 20 (1975).
64. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 98-99 (1972). Neither decision found substantial governmental interests justifying discrim-

ination between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing. These cases are injecting an
equal protection notion into first amendment protection. See generally Stone, supra note 63;

Karst, supra note 63.
65.

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 564-65 (Burger, C.J., dissent-

ing); id. at 554-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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lic debate. For these reasons, the plurality properly refused to find
San Diego's distinction between different types of speech a constitutional one.
By recognizing that the exceptions to the ban on billboards were
content oriented, the plurality substantially refined the first amendment analysis of billboard regulations. In similar situations, other
courts have myopically continued to characterize regulations as content neutral rather than rigorously analyzing them under content
standards.6" Those courts upheld billboard regulations under the content-neutral time, place or manner standard, thereby decreasing the
protection of first amendment rights.
In its totality, the plurality's opinion leaves municipalities in a
difficult position when they legitimately desire to regulate billboards.
The decision would allow the eradication of billboards that carry
commercial messages, and would invalidate any regulations of noncommercial billboards if the ordinance discriminated among billboards based on the content or subject matter of the messages. Yet,
the plurality left unanswered the important question of whether an
ordinance prohibiting all noncommercial speech, as well as all commercial speech, would be unconstitutional. 7 A municipality's natural
inclination may be to regulate solely commercial billboards. This solution raises serious implementation problems because of the difficulty of distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial

speech0 8
Furthermore, assuming the distinction can be made, questions
arise concerning the propriety of trusting the decision to a city official on a case-by-case basis. 9 And as Justice Brennan pointed out in
66. See, e.g., John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978), rev'd
John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), affd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 868, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 521, 610
P.2d 407, 418 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d
741 (N.D. 1978), appealdismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 593
P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979).
67. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20.
68, While the Court has stated that there are "commonsense differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976), the distinction in some cases is particularly difficult. For example, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), an advertisement for
abortion services concerned a commercial transaction but also "conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience" which could be classified as noncommercial
speech. Id. at 822. See Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 330-31.
69. Justice Brennan goes so far as to suggest that resting such discretion in the hands of
the city will create an unconstitutional prior restraint. 453 U.S. at 537-38 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/9

14

Liuzzi: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
19821

METROMEDIA

V. SAN DIEGO

his concurrence,. it would create havoc as users of billboards attempted to evade the commercial speech regulation by fashioning
their messages in noncommercial speech terms.70 By narrowly focusing on the independent effect of the ordinance upon commercial and
noncommercial speech, the plurality has created an unmanageable
standard to guide legislatures.
An obvious alternative would be for municipalities to run the
risk of suit and ban all billboards--commercial, noncommercial, onsite, and off-site. Three concurring and dissenting Justices, in Metromedia, proposed standards that will effect the possibility of a total
ban of billboards.
II.

THE REMAINING JUSTICES

While the plurality claimed that the prospect of a total prohibition of outdoor advertising was not before the Court,71 the perception
of the ordinance as a total ban received much attention from some of
the other Justices. Justice Brennan contended "that the practicaleffect of the San Diego ordinance is to eliminate the billboard as an
effective medium of communication for the speaker. . . and that the
exceptions do not alter the overall character of the ban.17 2 On this

point Justice Stevens, in his dissent, was in agreement." The significance of characterizing the ordinance as a total ban of outdoor advertising is, as depicted by Justice Brennan, a "First Amendment
analysis quite different from the plurality's." 7 4 The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, with their separate
standards, evaporates, and the overall practical effect of the ordinance becomes the focus of the analysis. These Justices disputed precisely what the total ban analysis entails and, as a result, applied two
different formulations. Chief Justice Burger also became involved in
creating a standard for a San Diego-type ordinance, using a total
ban case as a basis for his standard.7 5 The underlying assumption of

the three analytical frameworks is that a total ban of a medium of
communication under certain circumstances, not necessarily those
presented in Metromedia, is constitutional. The case law, however, is
not so clear. In order to scrutinize these decisions adequately, one
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

538-40 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
515 n.20.
525-26 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
526 (Brennan, J., concurring).
559 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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must understand how the Court has treated a total prohibition of a
medium of communication prior to the Metromedia decision.
The Total Ban of A Medium: An Evolution
Through a long series of decisions the Court has established
that time, place or manner regulations are permitted and has developed a method of analysis for such cases.76 Historically, the issue of
a total ban of a medium of communication has not been the subject
of constitutional commentators' or scholars' debate,7 7 nor has the
Court frequently dealt with such a prospect. 8 In fact, the substance
of the Court's stance on a total ban must be gleaned from just a
handful of cases. Significantly, it was not until the Court's decision
in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,7 9 decided three weeks
before Metromedia, that the term "total ban" was recognized as
representing a specific form of analysis in first amendment litigation.
This closed a gap of thirty-one years since the last case that had
76. Time, place or manner regulations are permitted by the Court because the regulations are not aimed at the ideas or information being conveyed and a legitimate interest exists
in other aspects of the speech. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding statute restricting solicitation to a fixed location at a
state fair); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating ordinance that banned commercial advertising of prescription
prices); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding ordinance that prohibited disturbing noises in vicinity of school while in session); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
47-48 (1966) (upholding local trespass ordinance that prohibited demonstrations on grounds of
local jail); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (invalidating unlimited discretion in
local official to grant parade license but stating that state or municipality could regulate the
use of city facilities or assure public safety or convenience); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
85, 88 (1949) (upholding regulation of "loud and raucous" noise from sound trucks); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding parade license regulation enacted to regulate traffic, secure public order and prevent simultaneous parades); See generally J. BARRON
& C.T. DIENEs, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRaSS 93-110 (1979); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-82 (1978); Kaufman, The Medium. The Message and
the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1970).
77. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum Cox v. Louisiana, 1975 Sup. Cr.
REv. 1, 12-21; Kaufman, supra note 76; Stone, supra note 29, at 239-49, 254-60; Note, The
Public Forum: Minimum Access Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV.'
117 (1975).
78. The Supreme Court has struck down a total ban of several types of media. See
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live entertainment); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (leaflets); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door canvassing); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (leaflets). Several cases, decided on other grounds, have referred to an absolute ban of a media as impermissible. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (leaflets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (leaflets).
79. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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discussed an absolute prohibition of a medium.80 This section will
explore the Court's treatment of a total ban of a medium in relation
to three media: leaflets, door-to-door soliciting and sound trucks.
a. Leaflets.-In Lovell v. City of Griffin,81 the Court invalidated
an ordinance that prohibited all unlicensed distribution of literature
at any time or place within the city limits. Besides objecting to placing such wide discretion in the hands of a municipal official, the
Court, in dicta, expressed its uneasiness with the broad sweep of the
ordinance: "The ordinance embraces 'literature' in the widest sense.
The ordinance is comprehensive with respect to the method of distribution. It covers every sort of circulation 'either by hand or otherwise.' There is thus no restriction in its application with respect to
time or place."82

The following year, the Court considered the constitutionality of
several similar ordinances. In Schneider v. State,83 three of the four
defendant municipalities absolutely forbade the distribution of handbills or circulars in the streets or public places of their communities.
In each instance the stated governmental objective was to prevent
littering and preserve the good appearance of the city, but the Court
explicitly held this governmental interest insufficient to sustain such
a broad limitation on first amendment rights." Additionally, the
Court observed that the objective could be achieved in a manner less
restrictive of freedom of expression, such as through a law directly
punishing littering.85
Several years later, in Jamison v. Texas8 the Court followed
Lovell and Schneider to strike down a statute that prohibited distribution of all handbills on the streets of Dallas, Texas. The issue
came before the Court when two Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted
for distributing handbills on the street. The Court rejected the city's
argument that its power over the streets went beyond regulation for
the control of traffic and maintenance of order. The city had argued
that it had absolute power to prohibit the use of its streets for the
communication of ideas. 87 According to the Court, one who is rightfully on a public street has a right to express his or her views in an
80. The last total ban case was Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
81.

303 U.S. 444 (1938).

82. Id. at 451.
83.

308 U.S. 147 (1939).

84. Id. at 162.
85. Id.
86.

318 U.S. 413 (1943).

87. Id. at 415-16.
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orderly fashion by spoken words, handbills and literature.88 While a
city might constitutionally regulate the distribution of handbills to
control traffic and maintain order, the Court concluded, "[t]he right
to distribute handbills concerning religious subjects on the streets
may not be prohibited at all times, at all places and under all
circumstances." 89
b. Door-to-doorsoliciting and canvassing.-The cases concerning door-to-door soliciting and canvassing went a step beyond communication in the streets, reaching into the privacy of the home. In
Martin v. City of Struthers,9" a city ordinance outlawed all door-todoor distribution of handbills or other advertisements that involved
summoning occupants to the door. A Jehovah's Witness was convicted of violating the ordinance after she had knocked on a door to
deliver a religious pamphlet. The Court perceived its duty to involve
the balancing of the conflicting interests of privacy in one's home,
protection of residents from burglars and the speaker's right to use
this traditional method of communicating ideas.9 1 In the course of
invalidating the ordinance, the Court observed that: "While door to
door distributors of literature may be either a nuisance or a blind for
criminal activities, they may also be useful members of society engaged in the dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best traditions of free discussion."92 As a result, the choice was left to the
householder to decide whether he or she wanted to receive the infor93
mation at the doorstep.
88. Id. at 416.
89. Id. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (city-wide ban of handbills not
spared from unconstitutionality by qualification permitting distribution where handbills carried
the names and addresses of persons who prepared them). See also Van Nuys Publishing Co.,
Inc. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777, 489 P.2d 809 (1971) (invalidating ordinance that prohibited all distribution of handbills without prior permission of owner, resident or occupant).
90. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Prior to Martin, the Court invalidated another prohibition on
door-to-door solicitation. One of the defendant municipalities in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939), prohibited all door-to-door canvassing in the city without a permit from the chief
of police. As in Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), the Court invalidated the
ordinance because of the potential for censorship. The Court suggested, however, that regulation of the hours or other such features of canvassing might be permissible. Schneider, 308
U.S. at 165.
91. 319 U.S. at 143.
92. Id. at 145.
93. Id. at 147. In Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court upheld
an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door commercial solicitation. Its validity, however, is uncertain since commercial speech now receives some first amendment protection. But see May v.
People, 636 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo. 1981) (upholding applicability of Breard to a prohibition of
door-to-door commercial solicitation).
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c. Sound trucks.-In Kovacs v. Cooper" a person was convicted
under a city statute for using a sound truck on a public street to
broadcast a speech and music. The Justices disputed the scope of the
statute and the permissibility of a total ban with such division that
no single opinion managed to marshall a majority of the Court.
Three Justices voted to uphold the legislation, narrowly construing it as a prohibition of only those sound trucks that emitted "loud
and raucous" noises.95 A prime factor motivating the decision was
the way sound trucks infringed on the right of privacy of the intended audience who was helpless to escape the noise without the
municipality's protection.96 Although affirming the conviction, they
explicitly stated that an "[a]bsolute prohibition within municipal
limits of all sound amplification.

. .

is undesirable and probably un-

constitutional as an unreasonable interference with normal
activities.' 7
In two concurring opinions, the same ordinance was interpreted
as creating a total ban of sound trucks. 98 Both opinions considered it
within the power of a municipality to prohibit the use of a medium
of communication.
Justice Black, in a persuasive dissent,'9 agreed that the ordinance was in fact a total ban of sound trucks, but argued that it
unconstitutionally restricted first amendment rights. He stated that
the regulation would discourage the widespread dissemination of information and make it difficult for certain groups to communicate. 100
Justice Rutledge, in a separate dissent,101 asserted that the abuses of
sound trucks should be regulated by more narrowly drawn statutes.
On the surface, the Court upheld an ordinance which a majority
of its members characterized as a total ban of sound trucks. Upon
closer inspection, though, a different majority of the Court espoused
94. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The year prior to Kovacs the Court, in Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948), declared unconstitutional a statute that required a permit to use a loudspeaker in public places. As in prior cases, the Court was concerned with the lack of standards
to confine the discretion of enforcement officials. The statute, in addition, was criticized for
failing to be drawn narrowly enough to regulate only the hours or places of use or the volume
of sound. Saia, 334 U.S. at 560.
95. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. at 85.
96. Id. at 87.
97. Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J., & Rutledge, J.). Justice Murphy dissented without opinion.
100. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 104 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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that an absolute ban of sound trucks was not constitutionally
permissible.102
In summary, these decisions struck down a broad prohibition of
a medium in the face of government interests in littering, privacy
and crime prevention, and instead required that the regulation be
narrowly drawn to regulate only the time, place or manner of
speech.103 This distinction was recently reiterated by the Court when
it upheld a zoning ordinance that restricts the location of adult theaters, partially on the
ground that it did not completely ban the thea104
ters from the city.
The Court has sought to protect a diversity of media from total
prohibition in order to ensure meaningful access to effective channels
of communication.10 5 According to some commentators 0 " and vari102. Justice Pettine stated, when analyzing Kovacs and its applicability to Maine's
state-wide ban of billboards, that "the issue [in Kovacs] was the city's ability to regulate the
manner of amplification-i.e., 'loud and raucoues'-rather than the permissibility of a total
ban." John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 18 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original), affd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981). See Phillips v. Township, 305
F. Supp. 763, 764-65 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Kalven, supra note 77, at 21 n.76; 10 A.L.R.2d 618,
627, 628, 634.
Kovacs has been relied on as authority for the validity of time, place or manner restrictions, lending support for the proposition that it did not permit a total ban of sound trucks. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
103. This effectively refutes Judge Tobriner's assertion that "[t]he distinction between
prohibition and regulation ... is one of words and not substance." Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 863, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 518, 610 P.2d 407, 415 (1980), rev'd,
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
104. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The Court noted that
the ordinance was only a place limitation and stated "The situation would be quite different if
the ordinance had the effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." Id.
at 71 n.35. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 894-95, 164 Cal. Rptr.
510, 538, 610 P.2d 407, 435 (1980) (Clark, J., dissenting), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
105. The Court stated in dicta in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949), that "the
right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners
and to do so there must be an opportunity to win their attention." (quoted in Heffron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981)).
A diversity of media is essential to this goal. Justice Powell observed that "[t]he primary
concern of the free speech guarantee is that there be full opportunity for expression in all of its
varied forms to convey a desired message." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). See Stone, supra note 29, at 233-34, 256 (right to
freedom of expression necessarily encompasses right to utilize effective means of
communication).
The court in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 93 (1968), in finding a
bus terminal to be an appropriate place to distribute leaflets, noted that "[t]he methods
adopted may be unsophisticated or crude and even ineffectual when compared with other
means, but they are no less robust and no less intended to air the speaker's views as effectively
as his resources and energy permit." Id.
106. Professor Thomas Emerson identified four values as underlying the first amend-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/9

20

Liuzzi: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
1982]

METROMEDIA

V. SAN DIEGO

ous courts, 107 the survival of democracy depends upon the widest
possible dissemination of information and opinion from diverse and
antagonistic sources. It. has often been recognized that open, robust
debate will educate the citizenry and, more importantly, lead to political truth.' 0 8 Implicit in these first amendment values is an acknowledgement that the media of communication must be protected
in order to protect the message sought to be conveyed,"0 9 and that
the medium may be part of the self-fulfillment" 0 component of
speech, such as in the case of symbolic speech."'
In the cases considered above, each medium was noted for its
importance to communication. Leaflets were recognized as "historic
weapons in the defense of liberty,""' and door-to-door canvassing
was considered a centuries old tradition" 8 and their distribution
"perhaps the most effective way of bringing [opinion] to the notice
of individuals."" 4 Recognition of the value of more modern communication technologies arrived with the advent of loudspeakers and
sound trucks, which the Court called "indispensible instruments of
ment: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) advance of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3)
participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper
balance between stability and change and promotion of orderly social change. Emerson, supra
note 47, at 423-28. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 4-5 (1970);
Karst, supra note 63, at 23-26.
107. In concurring with the invalidation of a prohibition on door-to-door soliciting, Justice Murphy noted: "Repression has no place in this country. It is our proud achievement to
have demonstrated that unity and strength are best accomplished, not by enforced orthodoxy
of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible measure of freeedom of conscience and thought." Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 150 (1940) (Murphy, J.,
concurring). See infra notes 108-11.
108. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35
(1980); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 357 (1927).
109. Judge Kaufman, in an article exploring the regulation of media and its effect upon
first amendment interests, stated that "some media are particularly effective for the expression
of certain specific messages, and the prohibition of the media would greatly impair the ability
of speakers effectively to advocate those causes." Kaufman, supra note 76, at 773.
110. See infra note 216.
111. The importance of symbolic speech was recognized in Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971), concerning a jacket bearing a vulgar anti-draft message, where the Court
stated that "much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force." Id. at 26.
112. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
113. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
114. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
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effective public speech. 11 5 Two other factors commonly considered
by the Court are the widespread use of the communication channels
by diverse groups116 and the availability of a medium to groups lacking access to more traditional channels.11 7 These factors recognize
that unconventional media have been employed by unpopular dissenters 18 and poorly financed groups;119 closing these channels of
communication, while content neutral and apparently nondiscriminatory, would effectively silence those who could not afford or did not
control the more expensive media of television, newspapers and radio. 120 This would result in a monopoly over communications media
for the more orthodox viewpoints and a de facto limit on free speech.
While protecting a medium, the Court has not been totally insensitive to competing interests. The Court has been solicitous of privacy in the home, yet has not found it to outweigh the first amendment rights of door-to-door canvassers. 21 Similarly, the Court has
been sensitive, under the "captive audience" doctrine, 22 to the right
of unwilling listeners to be free from intrusion by loudspeakers.1 23 At
the same time, it has not allowed this doctrine to expand to include
every instance in which an individual is confronted with a medium
he or she finds disturbing or distasteful. 24
115. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948). A year later Justice Black observed
that "[t]he basic premise of the First Amendment is that all present instruments of communication as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). See Kalven, supra note 77, at 30; L.
TRIBE, supra note 76, at 683.
117. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida 385 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102-03 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); Kalven, supra note 77, at 30.
118. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102, 103 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
119. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
120. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102-04 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). Professor Emerson noted
that "[i]t has long been recognized that one of the chief deficiencies of our system of freedom
of expression is the increasing concentration of ownership of the means of communication and
the inability of diverse points of view to gain access to the marketplace of ideas." Emerson,
supra note 47, at 461; accord Kaufman, supra note 76, at 773.
121. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
122. Under the captive audience doctrine, regulations of speech are allowed that might
not otherwise be permitted because of the inability of the observer to avoid the communication.
See L, TRIBE, supra note 76, at 677-78; Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 329-32; Stone, supra note
29, at 262-80; Note, supra note 77, at 144-48; infra note 225.
123. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 86-87.
124. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)
(duty on recipient to throw out insert received in billing envelopes that inflamed his or her
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Justice Brennan's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan severely criticized the plurality's superficial analysis of the San Diego ordinance and remained
unconvinced that its holding was constitutional.125 He proposed instead that a city could totally ban billboards only where a sufficiently
substantial governmental interest was directly furthered by the total
ban, and that a more narrowly drawn restriction would not promote
the achievement of that goal. 28 Strictly applying this standard, Justice Brennan asserted that the San Diego ordinance was
unconstitutional.
When analyzing the ordinance, Justice Brennan refused to defer
to the legislature and questioned the applicability of cases decided
under the police power to a first amendment context.1 27 Furthermore, he took issue with the purportedly direct connection between
San Diego's goals and its ordinance, analyzing the city's ability to
adopt equally effective measures that would place less of a restriction
upon first amendment freedoms.1 28 In his view, San Diego failed to
prove that billboards actually presented a traffic hazard or that the
ordinance was narrowly drawn to further the goal of traffic safety.1 29
Nor was he satisfied that a substantial government interest in aesthetics 0was adequately evidenced for commercial and industrial
13
areas.
Justice Brennan's perceptive analysis, however, is hampered by
the fact that the origins of his asserted standard were not based on a
firm foundation of total ban jurisprudence. Brennan cited as support
for his standard the recently decided case of Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim."'1 In evaluating a total ban of live entertainment
throughout the borough, the Schad Court concluded that to pass
constitutional muster the statute must further a sufficiently substansensibilities); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (invalidating
regulation of content of films shown at drive-in movie theaters because passersby could avert
their eyes).

125. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., concurring,
joined by Blackmun, J.).
126. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan gave no discussion
of whether San Diego's ordinance was content neutral, he called the Schad test, which he

would apply in Metromedia, a content neutral standard. Id. at 526 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 528 n.7 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
128. Id. at 528-34 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
129. Id. at 528-30 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
130. Id. at 530-34 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
131. Id. at 527 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981)).
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tial governmental interest, and that the Court must determine
whether the interest could be served by a less intrusive restriction."3 2
The Schad Court found that the borough's statute did not meet this
standard and, hence, declared it unconstitutional.133
Justice Brennan claimed the Schad decision was "merely articulating an analysis applied in previous cases concerning total bans of
media of expression.

1 34

This conclusion is inaccurate since only one

case relied on by the Schad Court as support for its standard was a
3 6 decision contotal ban case. 3 5 Utilizing the Schneider vi State"
cerning a total ban of handbills, the Schad Court quoted language
instructing the Court to weigh the conflicting interests and "appraise
1 7
the substantiality of the reasons advanced" by the government.
This language was understood by the Schad Court to require proof
of a "sufficiently substantial government interest" in order to sustain
a total ban of a medium of communication. 38 The analysis in the
Schneider case itself suggests a very high level of Court scrutiny13 9
132. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 68-70.
133. The Borough of Mount Ephraim failed to provide sufficient justification for the
substantial restriction on live entertainment. In addition, no information was introduced to
support the borough's asserted justifications for the ban. See supra note 49. Furthermore, the
borough did not establish that its interests could not be met by restrictions that were less
intrusive on first amendment interests. 452 U.S. at 74.
134. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 527 (Brennan, J., concurring).
135. In a footnote, the Schad Court cited U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), concerning an incidental infringement of symbolic speech, and two land use cases. 452 U.S. at 6869 n.7. In Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a municipal ordinance defined
"family" in a way that prohibited some blood relatives from living together. This was found to
unconstitutionally infringe on liberty interests. The other land use case, Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), held that a statute permitting only one-family dwellings did not
burden fundamental rights. Lending further confusion to the meaning of the Schad standard,
the Schad Court cited the dissent in Boraas, in which Justice Marshall argued that the ban at
issue was an infringement on fundamental rights and required a "compelling and substantial
governmental interest" for the statute to be valid. Id. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, he would have required that the statute be narrowly drawn.
In the text of the opinion, the Schad Court relied on Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), which had invalidated a municipal ordinance that prohibited the
solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that did not use at least 75% of their
receipts for charitable purposes. 452 U.S. at 70. Although the statute regulated a medium of
expression, the Schaumburg Court did not consider the ordinance to be an absolute prohibition
of door-to-door solicitation.
136. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
137. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 69-70.
138. Id. at 68.
139. The Schneider decision has in fact been interpreted as requiring a compelling state
interest. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960). The term "substantial government interest" has come to have less value
in more recent decisions. When discussing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), upholding a
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that is not necessarily captured in the term "sufficiently substantial,"
which implies a middle level of scrutiny conducive to widely varying
degrees of analysis.' 40 Though Justice Brennan, in Metromedia, and
the Schad Court subjected the respective statutes to scrupulous analysis, there is no guarantee that a future court would follow suit when
guided by this standard. Therein lies the weakness of the standard.
Additionally, the importance of the standard is diminished by
evidence that Brennan applied the same standard to evaluate a time,
place or manner restriction, a lesser infringement of speech. In Heffron v. InternationalSociety of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 1 the
Court upheld a statute that restricted solicitation on fairgrounds to
appointed booths. Justice Brennan stated in a partially concurring
14
and dissenting opinion: 1
[T]he issue in this case is whether [the statute] constitutes a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on respondents' exercise of protected First Amendment rights. In deciding this issue,
the Court considers, inter alia, whether the regulation serves a significant governmental interest and whether
that interest can be
43
served by a less intrusive restriction.,

There appears to be no decipherable difference between the two
prohibition on draft card burning, based on a narrowly drawn substantial governmental interest test, one writer noted that "substantial" was no protection at all and that "earlier cases
protecting more traditional forms of expression (such as the distribution of handbills) although
they too purported to apply a sort of less restrictive alternative test, gave it a significantly
stronger meaning." Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARe. L. REV. 1482, 1485-86 (1975) (footnote
omitted).
One writer, examining the value placed on effective communication of ideas, stated that
"when several cities sought to keep their streets clean by prohibiting handbilling-a highly
effective method of communication-the Court subjected their means to strict scrutiny and,
finding that other means would serve as well, invalidated the ordinances." Note, Of Interests
Fundamentaland Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REV. 462,
497 (1977) (footnote omitted).
140. See supra note 144.
141. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
142. Id. at 656 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
concurred in the result for some of the activities in question but dissented because he thought
the analysis should have been applied separately to each first amendment activity restricted by
the ordinance and not as a group.
143. Id. (Brennan, J., concuring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted). This
standard resembles the analysis in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972),
upholding an anti-noise statute for the vicinity surrounding school buildings while school was
in session as a reasonable time, place or manner regulation. The Court required proof that the
regulation was necessary to further significant governmental interests and that the regulation
was narrowly tailored to further that interest. Id. at 114-17.
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standards, yet one is utilized by Brennan in the factual context of a
total ban of a medium and the other when only the time, place or
manner of speech is regulated. Both standards require a "sufficiently
substantial" or "significant" government interest-terms used interchangably by the CourtU'"--and that the regulation be narrowly
drawn.
Moreover, further confusion arises because to support the standard he enunciated in Heffron, Justice Brennan cited both total ban
and time, place or manner cases. 14 5 It is well settled that the Court
will utilize a relatively low level of scrutiny to evaluate a time, place
or manner restriction. By using the same standard in the instance of
a total prohibition and a time, place or manner regulation, Justice
Brennan gave the impression that the total ban case should not receive severe scrutiny by the Court and weakened the weight attributed to a "sufficiently substantial" government interest.
Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens was the only Justice who grappled with the
question of the constitutionality of a total ban of a medium. At
points in his analysis, he displayed remarkable insight into the magnitude of the threat to speech presented by a total ban. For example,
he noted that there exists an inherent distinction between a total ban
and a time, place or manner regulation because the latter, by its very
nature, implies that "the net effect of the regulation on free expression would not be adverse."" 4 1 Although he admitted that a total ban
has an adverse effect on speech, he concluded that a total ban in
general, and the San Diego ordinance in particular, is constitutional.
He reached this conclusion after asserting that the first amendment
does not absolutely protect speech 147 and that a municipality could
curtail the effectiveness of a particular means of communication.
The latter assertion was based on a reading of Kovacs v. Cooper as
144. The Court apparently attaches the same meaning to the two terms. The plurality in
Schad, which Justice Brennan relied on for his standard, said the government must prove its
interest to be sufficiently substantial. 452 U.S. at 68. Then Justice Blackmun, concurring in
the same decision, stated that the zoning authority must be prepared to articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant basis for its decision. Id. at 76-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 656,
citing Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
146. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 549-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens expressed it in terms
that there is no protection of the quantity of communication, for otherwise a municipality
could not outlaw graffiti.
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permitting a total ban of sound trucks.1 48 Justice Stevens cited Justice Black, the most vociferous dissenter in Kovacs, as support for
this proposition. 49
Justice Stevens' reliance on Kovacs, and specifically on Justice
Black's dissent, was misplaced. Both the plurality and the dissenters
in Kovacs drew a distinction between the regulation of time, place or
manner of the use of sound trucks and the total ban of that medium.1 50 Justice Stevens cited Justice Black's assertion that a city
may restrict or absolutely ban the use of amplifiers on busy streets in
the business area.151 Significantly, Justice Black had qualified that
statement by contending that reasonable regulations of place (busy
streets in the business area), manner (volume of sound), or time
(hours) of use of sound trucks would be permitted, but an "absolute
prohibition of all uses could not be permitted. 52 Justice Black was
also very sensitive to the argument that closing off one channel of
communication favored and encouraged other media. 53 Access to
the remaining media may be more expensive and may rest in the
control of a few hands. To ban one medium completely, then, might
148. Id. at 550-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). In a footnote, Justice Stevens tried to
show how decisions invalidating a prohibition or regulation of leaflets and door-to-door canvassing were in line with his thesis, but there are problems with his analysis. Id. at 551 n.23
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part). First, he contended the decisions were invalidated because the
regulation accomplished the state interest in an indirect manner. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part). One of the cases though, as the basis for its decision, stated that the governmental
interest did not outweigh the significant infringement of speech. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 162 (1939). Second, he pointed out that some of the cases were invalidated because they
were licensing statutes enabling officials to engage in censorship. 453 U.S. 551 n.23 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part). While correct, he ignored the significant dicta by the Court indicating
displeasure with an absolute ban. See Talley v. California, 363 U.S. 60, (1960); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). Third, Justice Stevens noted that the decisions involved
Jehovah's Witnesses, and consequently, the Court was more sensitive to the possibility the
ordinance was used to surpress unpopular viewpoints. 453 U.S. at 551 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). However, except for Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), and Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court did not focus on the fact that a religious group
was involved. In Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943), the Court discussed the
importance of door-to-door canvassing to a wide variety of groups. Similarly, in Schneider, the
Court noted that the leaflet ban would apply to anyone with views on "political, social or
economic questions". 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
149. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citing Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 104 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting)).
150. See supra notes 95-97, 99-102 and accompanying text.
151. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J.,dissenting in part) (citing Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. at 104 (Black, J.,dissenting)).
152. 336 U.S. at 104 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens quotes Justice Black's full
language in a footnote but fails to account for it. 453 U.S. at 550-51 n.22 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part).
153. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. at 102-03 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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result in a denial of the practical ability to speak for some groups. 154
While Justice Stevens correctly notes that no cases have held that
the quantity of communication is protected per se, under Justice
Black's analysis, a regulation could be invalidated because the reduction in communication represents a barrier to expression for certain
groups or ideas.
Once satisfied that a total ban is constitutional, Justice Stevens
evaluated the San Diego ordinance. Unlike the other Justices, Justice Stevens did not label a specific level of government interest that
might outweigh the first amendment interests at hand. Nevertheless,
he discussed San Diego's interest in "maintaining pleasant surroundings and enhancing property values" 15 5 which, according to him,
were "equally legitimate and substantial in all parts of the city."1 5 6
Stevens implicitly indicated, therefore, that no more than a substantial governmental interest need be proven to permit a total ban of
billboards. 157 As was the case with the plurality, 58 he failed to explore the legitimacy of the interests supporting a total ban. Instead,
he simply accepted their existence without proof. Since he believed
that the sufficiency of the governmental interest was obvious,- Justice
Stevens focused his inquiry on (1) whether the regulation favored
one viewpoint or limited the subjects of debate and (2) whether the
total market for communication was "ample and not threatened [by]
gradually increasing restraints." 1519 The first criterion is a requirement that the statute be content neutral,160 the second suggests a
broad inquiry into whether alternative media are available. These
two inquiries, along with the implicit consideration of the governmental interest in the regulation, closely resemble the traditional
time, place or manner analysis.1 61 This result appears paradoxical in
154. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
155. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
156. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
157. The plurality criticized Justice Stevens for not explicitly articulating a governmental interest that would outweigh the first amendment interests at stake. Id. at 517 n.22. There
does not seem to be an intent by Stevens to neglect consideration of the governmental interest
in the balance. On the contrary, he asserted that the substantiality of the interests involved in
this case were "[b]eyond dispute" and thus he did not formally include it in his inquiry. Id. at
552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
158. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
159. 453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
160. The Court in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980), stated, "The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic."
161. See Infra note 188.
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light of Stevens' earlier assertion that a total ban is unlike a time,
place or manner regulation.
In another area of his analysis, Justice Stevens recognized the
severe threat to speech posed by a total ban when he stated that "the
remaining channels of communication will [not] be just as effective"
without billboards. 16 2 Yet, he concluded that there was no "reason to
believe that the overall communications market in San Diego was
inadequate." 16 3 This seemingly inconsistent conclusion arose from
Stevens' broad inquiry into the effect of the ordinance and his perception of the degree of first amendment protection afforded the
quantity and quality of communication. Based on his examination of
the "overall communications market," he concluded that the loss of
1
one medium would have little impact on the market as a whole. 6
When the Court has considered the availability of other channels of communication in time, place or manner cases, it has usually
analyzed whether the other available media were comparable in cost
and effectiveness.1 65 Concerning the San Diego ordinance, Justice
Stevens admitted that "[i]f the ban is enforced, some present users
of billboards will not be able to communicate in the future as effectively as they do now." 16 8 In effect, Justice Stevens would extend
even less protection to a total ban of a medium than that extended to
a time, place or manner regulation. It would seem, however, that the
total closing of a channel of communication warrants greater judicial
scrutiny.
Moreover, in the course of his consideration of the overall communications market in San Diego, Justice Stevens made an alarming
revelation, stating that "it may well be true in San Diego as in other
metropolitan areas that the volume of communication is excessive
and that the public is presented with too many words and pictures to
recognize those that are most worthy of attention. 1 67 This statement
is a total repudiation of the "marketplace of ideas" 6 ' concept long
recognized in first amendment jurisprudence and if generally ac162. 453 U.S. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 552-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
165. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
Infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
166. 453 U.S. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
167. Id. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
168. The phrase was first coined by Justice Holmes when he stated that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ..
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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cepted by the Court would present a serious danger to free speech.
Such "excessive" communication is precisely the price we must pay
for our constitutional freedom.""'
The last step of Justice Stevens' analysis-that the statute not
favor one viewpoint or limit the subjects for debate-was satisfied
because the statute was content neutral and contained no hint of bias
or censorship. 170 Among the ordinance's exceptions, he found no suggestion that San Diego was attempting to influence public opinion or
limit public debate on particular issues. The only exception he saw
as potentially violative of the first amendment was the provision permitting political campaign signs. 71 Stevens considered this exception
justified, however, by the special value placed on communication
during a political campaign. 72 On this point Justice Stevens erred.
The Court has held in the past that there is an "equality of status in
the field of ideas,"1 so that a government's justification for discriminating among the content of messages must go beyond valuing the
content of one subject over another.
Chief Justice Burger's Dissent
Chief Justice Burger admonished the plurality and concurrence
for mechanically applying first amendment doctrines to the San Diego statute.174 Rather than categorize the ordinance as a time, place
or manner regulation or a total ban of a medium of communication,
he described the issue in terms of the ability of a local government to
protect its citizens from traffic hazards and unaesthetic structures
and to determine whether the public's need for information out169. A unanimous Court in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 97 (1979), quoted with approval the language of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
California: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and falacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, Justice Marshall, writing in Linmark, quoted the Court in Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), decrying
a paternalistic approach and asserting that "people will perceive their own best interests if only
they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them." 431 U.S. at 97 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v.Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 770).
170. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 554-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part).
171. Id. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
172. Id. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
173. Police Dept v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
174. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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weighed these dangers. 7 5 As might be expected from his parochial
characterization of the issues, he displayed little sensitivity to the
first amendment interests at stake. Chief Justice Burger developed
an eclectic analysis for the statute that relied on a potpourri of total
ban and time, place or manner cases,176 and despite his opening
statements abhorring categorization, essentially employed a time,
place or manner analysis.
Before describing his formula to evaluate the ordinance, Chief
Justice Burger reviewed some of the basic principles in first amendment jurisprudence. First, each medium of expression must be assessed by standards suited for it.'7 7 Second, while some level of protection is afforded a medium, the right to speech is not absolute.171
Finally, he asserted that a total ban is permissible,17 9 according to
his interpretation of Kovacs.180 It is with the last proposition that
dispute is raised. According to Burger, the Kovacs Court upheld a
total ban of sound trucks because the ordinance lacked the potential
for censorship by public officials.1""
True, the plurality in Kovacs took pains to distinguish their situation from a preceding sound truck case that found an ordinance
unconstitutional because of its potential for censorship by government officials.18 2 Of far greater importance, however, the plurality in
Kovacs did not believe the ordinance to be a total ban of sound
trucks, and, in fact, stated that an absolute prohibition would probably be unconstitutional.' 83 There is also strong language from the
dissenting Justices that a total ban of a medium is unconstitutional.' 8 Upon close inspection only two Justices asserted that a to175. Id. at 557 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 558-59 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981) (invalidating a total ban of live entertainment); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding restriction of solicitation to booths at fairground); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding prohibition of draftcard burning); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding prohibition of
loud and raucous noise from sound trucks)).

177. 453 U.S. at 557 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
178.

Id. at 558 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

179. Id. at 558-59 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
180. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
181. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 558 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
182.

336 U.S. at 82-83 (distinguishing Kovacs from Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558

(1948)).
183.
184.
ing text.

336 U.S. at 81-82; see supra notes 95-97, 102 and accompanying text.
336 U.S. at 99-104 (Black, J., dissenting). See supra notes 99-101 and accompany-
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tal ban of sound trucks was permissible. 185 Thus, Burger's reliance
on Kovacs seems a weak reed upon which to base his conclusion that
a total ban is permissible.
Once assured that there is no absolute right to speak and that a
total ban is permissible, Chief Justice Burger proposed that San Diego could ban billboards if (1) a sufficiently substantial government
interest existed, (2) the legislative approach was neutral to the message conveyed, and (3) alternate channels of communication were
available.1 86 As was also true in Justice Stevens' proposed standard,18 7 the Chief Justice's standard mirrors the time, place or manner analysis. 188
In analyzing San Diego's ordinance under his proposed standard, the Chief Justice, without explanation, found a substantial
governmental interest in traffic safety and aesthetics.'8 " He then
found the statute to be content neutral because it did not prefer any
particular viewpoint over another, and aside from the limited exceptions, had not allowed some subjects while forbidding others.190 The
exceptions to the ordinance were perceived by Chief Justice Burger
to be "essentially negligible" and justified by the special effectiveness
of billboards to convey a political campaign message and by the public interest in the information permitted by the other exceptions. 91
He failed, however, to show how the public interest in temporary
political campaign signs is greater than the public interest in other
noncommercial messages conveyed by billboards. 92 Favoring one
subject without a substantial government interest to sustain the preference has been fatal to a statute in the past. 93 Furthermore, the
magnitude of the speech category is not a factor in the determination
of a regulation's constitutionality; even a relatively narrow restric185. 336 U.S. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring); see
supra note 98 and accompanying text.
186. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
187. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
188. His standard resembles the time, place or manner standard established in Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976),
which requires that restrictions be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that [it] serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing. . . leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Chief Justice Burger's approach was appropriately criticized by the plurality as being no more than a time, place or
manner analysis. 453 U.S. 517 n.23.
189. 453 U.S. at 560 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 564-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
192. See supra notes 64-65, 172-73 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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tion, such as prohibiting "for sale" signs on residences, has been held
unconstitutional.19 '
The Chief Justice, in his third step, found that adequate alternative channels of communication were available."9 5 On this point he
departed from all the other opinions' 96 and the stipulated agreement
of the parties. 197 Although he conceded that the other available media might not be so "eyecatching" or "cheap," he considered them
"adequate" nonetheless. 98
His discussion ignores the lesson of Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro.99 There the Court held an ordinance that
prohibited the use of "for sale" and "sold" signs, enacted to prevent
the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community, to be a violation of the first amendment. One of the reasons for
the holding was that the available substitute channels-newspaper
advertisements and real estate listings-were less effective media for
communicating the message because they were less likely to reach
the intended audience, more expensive, and less subject to the
speaker's control. 200 The lesson of Linmark is that possible alternative channels of communication must be feasible, the burden of proof
of which is on the party restricting speech. Reliance on the theoretical availability of other media would present a grave threat to first
amendment rights.
Billboards are an attractive means of communication because of
their low cost in relation to other media and the great exposure that
they provide to the speaker.201 Both characteristics are important to
194. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). See infra
notes 199-200 and accompanying text. The magnitude of the speech category found in an
exception to an ordinance that bans a medium of communication would only be relevant to
evaluate whether or not the ordinance is a total ban.
195. 453 U.S. at 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 516 (White, J., plurality opinion) (it cannot be assumed that there are
alternate channels of communication based on the parties stipulation to the contrary); id. at
525 (Brennan, J., concurring) (while other channels of communication exist, they are unsatisfactory); id. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (the remaining channels of communication
will not be as effective).
197. The stipulation of the parties stated that other forms of advertising were "insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive." Id. at 516.
198. Id. at 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
199. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
200. Id. at 93. Additional concerns of the Court were that the ordinance was not genuinely focused on the place or manner of speech and that it proscribed certain signs because of
their content. Id. at 93-94.
201. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine,
J., concurring), aff'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981) (discussing the particular advantages of billboards
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the commercial advertiser who wants to entice the traveling consumer and to the speaker with a noncommercial message. Local
businesses would have difficulty finding an alternative medium with
the same capability for timely appeal to travelers. 202 Billboards especially are effective for messages of local interest geared to a specific
neighborhood or location, particularly where the speaker has limited
financial resources. It seems that Chief Justice Burger was so taken
by the "offensive and intrusive" 20 3 qualities of billboards that he
failed to recognize their unique value as a medium of
communication.
III. AN

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

As the foregoing discussion reveals, the three Justices erroneously assumed that a total ban is constitutionally permissible. At
least two of the standards are indistinguishable from the time, place
or manner standard. Even in the application of this standard, there
are problems in the reasoning of Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens. Justice Brennan also succumbed to a blurring of standards
by applying his total ban standard to analyze a time, place or manner case.
Adopting such standards to review the total ban of a medium of
communication ignores the fact that a total ban is qualitatively different from a time, place or manner regulation and as such ought to
be more closely scrutinized. 20 ' A time, place or manner restriction
will usually present only a minimal burden on a speaker because the
ability to communicate through the medium is preserved in certain
circumstances. In contrast, an ordinance that totally eliminates a
widely used medium, at all times and all places, goes beyond an incidental regulation of speech. 20 5 The difference between the two types
of statutes is greater than one of degree. By closing a channel of
communication, speakers will find it more difficult, if not impossible,
to reach observers or listeners. This violates a cardinal principle of
as a medium of communication). See supra note 34; see infra notes 222-24 and accompanying
text.
202. Id.
203. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
204. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 18 (Ist Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J.,
concurring) (discussing the differences between a total ban and a time, place or manner restriction), af'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981).
205. See Id.
at 16, 19 & n.3 (Pettine, J., concurring) (total ban is a greater infringement
on first amendment interests than time, place or manner regulation); Stone, supra note 29, at
256-61 (absolute ban of billboards is severe burden on freedom of expression).
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the first amendment that a government regulation
cannot unduly re208
strict the flow of information or ideas.

More importantly, the low standard of scrutiny employed by the
time, place or manner standard inadequately protects against the
evils of the total ban of a medium. It allows a balancing process that
would be dependent upon the sympathies of the Justices and consequently might not protect the freedom of expression. 07
A total ban of a medium of expression so substantially threatens
first amendment values that it should be reviewed stringently by the
Court.20 8 Recognizing the severe impact of a total ban of billboards,
206. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); L. TIBE, supra note 76,
at 581-82 (government can regulate the noncommunicative aspects of speech but cannot unduly restrict the free flow of information and ideas).
207. Professor Lawrence Tribe has asserted that
[c]ategorical rules. . . tend to protect the system of free expression better because
they are more likely to work in spite of the defects in the human machinery on
which we must rely to preserve fundamental liberties. The balancing approach is
contrastingly a slippery slope; once an issue is a matter of degree, first amendment
protections become especially reliant on the sympathetic administration of the law.
L. TluBE, supra note 76, at 584. See also Emerson, supra note 47, at 440-54 (criticizing the
Burger Court's insensitivity to first amendment interests when balancing). Cf Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. RaV. 387 (1980) (arguing balancing has a proper role in
first amendment analysis).
208. Professor Thomas Emerson summarized the Court's treatment of this type of infringement: "It has always been a basic tenet of first amendment doctrine that any substantial
abridgment of first amendment rights-any significant chilling effect-is sufficient to trigger
the protection of that constitutional guarantee." Emerson, supra note 47, at 453-54. See also
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (significant impairment of first amendment rights
must be subjected to "exacting scrutiny"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) ("itlhe
strict test established in NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because compelled disclosure has
the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of first amendment rights").
Professor Lawrence Tribe proposed a two-track analysis which would permit strict scrutiny only in "track one" cases-those that involve a regulation of the content or subject matter. "Track two" cases characteristically have a noncommunicative impact on expression, such
as time, place or manner regulatibns, which he would subject only to a balancing of the governmental interests and the first amendment rights on a case-by-case basis. L. TRiBE, supra
note 76, at 581-82.
Professor Martin Redish, however, has criticized this approach:
Content-neutral restrictions like the prohibition of the distribution of all leaflets on
street corners or the requirement of disclosure of authorship on all handbills may
reduce the level and quality of contributions to the free exchange of ideas as significantly as any content based regulation. . . . [C]ontent-neutral restrictions may significantly undermine the value of free expression by imposing limitations on the
opportunity for individual expression. That the expression is regulated for reasons
other than its contents makes it no less an interference with expression.
[I]t is difficult to understand why content-neutral regulations should receive
any less scrutiny than other types of restriction.
Redish, The Content DistinctionIn FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 129-30
(1981). He proposed instead that courts subject all restrictions on expression to the same scru-
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Justice Brennan characterized the San Diego ordinance as a "substantial restriction of protected activity." 20 9 The Supreme Court has
previously held that "[w]here there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling. ' 210 By requiring a compelling government interest, 211 the standard effectively creates a presumption that the total ban of a medium is unconstitutional.
To satisfy the standard, the regulation, in addition, must be
drawn as narrowly as possible toward its intended goals. 21 2 A total
ban of a medium has such a widespread effect that it would be difficult to find that less restrictive means were not available. Earlier
total ban cases invalidated ordinances where less restrictive means
were available. 2 3 The Court must carefully evaluate the means-ends
fit and if another effective way exists to achieve the government's
objectives which does not as seriously infringe on expression, the
State must resort to it regardless of the added expense or
inconvenience.21 4
tiny used to evaluate content regulation.
209. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Schad Court made
the same statement regarding the total ban of live entertainment, 452 U.S. at 72, and, in
addition, stated "the ordinance challenged in this case significantly limits communicative activity within the Borough." Id. at 71.
210. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960), also quoted in NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 439 (1962).
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court applied a similar test in a somewhat different context and stated:
iT]he constitutional question may sound like a mathematical formula. But legal
'tests' do not have the precision of mathematical formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden of justification is on the State, and that
the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes.
Id. at 342-43 (discussing application of strict scrutiny test of equal protection to duration of
residence prerequisite to voting).
211. A compelling state interest has been defined as "a governmental interest so strong,
so important, that a threat to it not only suggests, but actually compels governmental action.
Only the interest of self-preservation can be so strong." Note, supra note 139, at 479 (emphasis in original).
212. The Court has adhered to the principle that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area
of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)
(citations omitted). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 76, at 722-23; Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
213. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943) (city's interest
in preventing criminal trespass can be controlled through general trespass statutes rather than
by prohibition of all door-to-door canvassing and solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 162 (1939) (prevention of littering better accomplished through punishmeni of those who
litter than by full prohibition of leaflets).
214. See Ely, supra note 139, at 1484-87; Note, supra note 139, at 507.
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While the availability of other media of communication may be
an appropriate factor for the Court to consider when evaluating a
time, place or manner regulation, it should not be considered when a
total ban is at issue. In the frequently quoted dicta from Schneider,
the Court stated that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other places. 21 The existence of other media
should not foreclose a speaker from using a medium which he believes to be the most appropriate for his message. Choice of the
channel of communication may be as important an act as the communication itself.2 16 In addition, a total ban is such an egregious infringement on the right to expression that the access to the medium
elsewhere does not suffice to remedy the abridgment. This is particularly true in the case of the speaker with unorthodox views, whose
access to alternative media may be limited.
Undoubtedly, no one would quarrel with applying this standard
215. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), quoted in Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (borough could not ban live entertainment on the basis it
is available elsewhere); id. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (availability of theaters or bookstores in nearby communities does not justify a ban in the borough); Southeastern Promotions
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (whether "Hair" might have been performed as
effectively in privately owned local theater was of no consequence). See also Emerson, supra
note 47, at 454 (existence of other channels of communication cannot be justification for closing off the particular means of expression that speaker has chosen).
In a noteworthy concurrence from another decision, Justice Black stated:
I cannot accept my brother Harlan's view that the abridgment of speech and press
here does not violate the First Amendment because other methods of communication are left open. This reason for abridgment strikes me as being on a par with
holding that governmental suppression of a newspaper in a city would not violate
the First Amendment because there continue to be radio and television stations.
First Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees than by
one fell swoop.
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 79-80 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
216. Justice Pettine, in considering a state-wide ban of billboards, noted:
When the state would outlaw a mode of expression-particularly a mode that has
traditionally received society's approval or at least tolerance-more is involved than
simply whether the speaker can adequately convey her message using means the
state still permit her to employ.
[FIrom the speaker's perspective. . . the choice of medium is a component of
the personal fulfillment fostered by the First Amendment . . .from the audience's
perspective . . . each medium makes a unique sensory and psychological impact

that cannot be precisely duplicated by any other, the speaker's autonomy in medium
selection is a factor that should not be undervalued.

John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 19 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J.,
concurring), afTd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981) (citations omitted). See also, Kaufman, supra note 76 (some
media are particularly effective for certain messages).
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to a statute that threatened total prohibition of a major medium
such as radio, television, or newspapers. One can easily perceive how
such a broad prohibition would substantially infringe upon the right
to free expression. Even the California Supreme Court, in an earlier
stage of the Metromedia litigation, did not quarrel when the plaintiffs proposed that leaflets, sound trucks, newspapers, and maps can
be "subjected only to narrowly drawn regulations serving a compelling governmental interest."21 7 It is not nearly so evident, however,
that strict scrutiny should be applied to media such as signs trailed
from airplanes, outdoor theaters, citizen band radios, bumper stick2 18
ers or billboards.
Although a prohibition of any medium jeopardizes first amendment values, some media may not warrant the compelling state interest standard. In the past, the Court has considered various characteristics of the medium to determine what degree of protection it
merited. 219 These include the medium's traditional or historical bases, the widespread use of the medium, the ability of the medium to
provide access for persons unlikely to use more traditional media,
and the extent to which the use of a medium may clash with another
fundamental right, such as privacy. 220 Taken as a whole, these factors help to characterize the importance of the medium to society to
determine if its elimination would be a substantial infringement of
first amendment rights. It should be noted that the first criterion-whether a medium is traditional-is not necessarily dispositive
because the Court has been receptive to recognizing changes in com22 1
munication abilities due to developing technology.
Billboards should be analyzed by the Court in these terms. They
are one of the oldest forms of mass communication. 222 Although
217.

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 870, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510,

522, 610 P.2d 407, 419 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). It distinguished billboards, how-

ever, because they are more obtrusive and permanent structures. But this rationale conflicts
with the Supreme Court decision that passersby could avoid exposure to nudity depicted at
drive-in movie theaters by averting their eyes. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975). See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d at 892-93, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
536-37, 610 P.2d at 433-34 (Clark, J., dissenting).
218. Some lower courts have applied this standard to other media. See, e.g., Wright v.
Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977) (prohibition of newspaper vending in
subway system); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974) (prohibition of leaflets in county welfare center waiting rooms).
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
Tocker, Standardized Outdoor Advertising: History, Economics and Self-Regula-

lion, OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 36 (J. Houck ed. 1969). The billboard is the descendant of the
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largely relied upon by businesses, their low cost also makes them
easily affordable for groups that do not have the resources to use
other more expensive media. 23 Given this country's extreme dependence on the automobile, billboards particularly are effective for enabling the speaker to reach a large, diverse audience. 2 4 While a city
or state might argue that billboards infringe on the fundamental
right to privacy and that observers are a captive audience, the observer may be required to ignore a billboard that he or she finds
offensive. 2 5
Consequently, a total ban of billboards must require strict judicial review.2 2 6 Under such an analysis, San Diego's entire statute
smaller posted bill utilized in the 17th and 18th centuries. After the 1870's, with the advance
of printing technology, outdoor advertising evolved into the standardized billboard. Its effectiveness as a medium of communication increased with the popularity of the automobile and
the development of a network of roads. Id. at 24-36.
223. Metromedia, Inc. provided figures comparing the cost of various media. For example, in 1978, the average cost per "rating point" in San Diego for 30-second commercials on
prime-time television was $65.00; for 30-second commercials on radio was $28.00; for one
page, black and white advertisements in weekly magazines was $83.00; for four color advertisements in monthly magazines was $93.00; for 600-line newspaper advertisements was
$25.00; but was only $6.00 on a standard billboard for thirty days. Brief for Appellant at 25,
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
224. See supra notes 34, 202 and accompanying text.
225. Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court used the captive audience doctrine as the rationale for regulating billboards because of their ability to thrust their message upon unwilling
observers. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) (upholding criminal penalties for
advertising cigarettes on billboards and streetcars) (quoted in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974)). But it is unlikely that the captive audience doctrine is
useful when analyzing billboard regulations any longer. In Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975), a case strikingly similar to the billboard cases, the Court struck down a
regulation of the content of films shown at drive-in movie theaters because passersby could
avert their eyes. The Court stated:
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, constantly
proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive
audiences for many purposes".... the burden normally falls upon the viewer "to
avoid further bombardment of [his or her] sensibilities simply by averting [his or
her] eyes."
Id. at 210-11 (citations omitted). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (duty on recipient to throw out insert received in billing envelope
that inflamed his or her sensibilities); Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 328-30. Cf. Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 729, 737 (1970) (unwanted mail is an invasion of the privacy of the
home).
226. When invalidating a statute essentially prohibiting all billboards upon rural byways, the court in State v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 342 n.3 (Okla. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
922 (1981), stated:
[W]e cannot hold the prohibition imposed by our act is an incidental restriction on
these freedoms. The act substantially encroaches upon the use of a recognized public forum, the streets. The existence of an alternative forum is not material to the
question. Additionally, the notion that aesthetic principles, however they are de-
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would be unconstitutional. The Court has not yet considered whether
governmental interests in traffic safety and aesthetics are compelling
interests, but the facts of Metromedia suggest that such a finding
would be unlikely.22 Additionally, the ordinance was not narrowly
drawn since the interests in traffic safety and aesthetics were not
shown to be pervasive throughout the city. But cities or states are
not forced to suffer with billboards that pose traffic or aesthetic
problems. Through less restrictive measures, such as regulations of
the location, size or lighting of signs, a government could remedy the
problem without so seriously infringing on first amendment rights.
Such regulation might also be extended to on-premise signs in order
to more fully accomplish the objectives of the statute.
CONCLUSION

The Metromedia Court was presented with the difficult task of
defining the scope of the first amendment protection extended to billboards. Many will applaud the outcome of this decision based on the
notion that billboards are "offensive." Billboards, however, are more
than an eyesore on our highways-they are an important means of
communication. The right to free speech depends upon effective
communication for a speaker through a viable medium. If a medium
is permitted to be totally eliminated, either through the plurality's
unworkable bifurcated approach, the more lenient time, place or
manner analysis of Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger, or the
total ban standard of Justice Brennan, a grave injustice is served
upon our democratic society. We need a diversity of media to ensure
access to channels of communication for unorthodox groups and
fined, constitute a compelling state interest which would justify a restriction on freedoms constitutionally guaranteed is rejected. Lastly, the manner and place restrictions imposed are not narrowly drawn to restrict only those written communications
posing a clear and present danger to the motorist.
(citations omitted). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 890, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510, 534, 610 P.2d 407, 431 (1980) rev'd, 453 US. 490 (1981) (Clark, J., dissenting) (because the ordinance prohibited expression of political, social, and commerical thought,
the ordinance must satisfy the most stringent rules of the first amendment). Professor Stone
implicitly invoked a strict scrutiny standard for a total ban of billboards when he expressed the
opinion that an absolute prohibition of billboards would be "constitutionally impermissible,"
Stone, supra note 28, at 261, and no more justifiable than an absolute ban on leafletting or
door-to-door canvassing. Id. at 258.
227. In Lotze v. Washington, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 57-59, 593 P.2d 811, 814 (1979), the
court found that governmental interests in traffic safety and aesthetics are "compelling state
interests" which sustain a state-wide regulation of billboards. However, it is a watered down
compelling interest standard because the court actually performed a time, place or manner
analysis which does not require strict scrutiny.
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viewpoints. It is not sufficient to rely upon the existence of mass media, such as television, newspapers or radio, to claim there is freedom
of speech for all. And it is the less popular or nontraditional media
that would more likely be banned under the Court's current panoply
of standards. Statutes that attempt to prohibit a communication medium deserve strict scrutiny by the Court; any unpleasant aesthetic
consequences are the price to be paid for rigorous enforcement of the
first amendment.
Angela M. Liuzzi
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